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Abstract. Research on vehicular networking (V2X) security has pro-
duced a range of security mechanisms and protocols tailored for this
domain, addressing both security and privacy. Typically, the security
analysis of these proposals has largely been informal. However, formal
analysis can be used to expose flaws and ultimately provide a higher level
of assurance in the protocols. This paper focusses on the formal analysis
of a particular element of security mechanisms for V2X found in many
proposals, that is the revocation of malicious or misbehaving vehicles
from the V2X system by invalidating their credentials. This revocation
needs to be performed in an unlinkable way for vehicle privacy even in
the context of vehicles regularly changing their pseudonyms. The Rewire
scheme by Förster et al. and its subschemes Plain and R-token aim
to solve this challenge by means of cryptographic solutions and trusted
hardware. Formal analysis using the Tamarin prover identifies two flaws:
one previously reported in the literature concerned with functional cor-
rectness of the protocol, and one previously unknown flaw concerning an
authentication property of the R-token scheme. In response to these
flaws we propose Obscure Token (O-token), an extension of Rewire
to enable revocation in a privacy preserving manner. Our approach ad-
dresses the functional and authentication properties by introducing an
additional key-pair, which offers a stronger and verifiable guarantee of
successful revocation of vehicles without resolving the long-term identity.
Moreover O-token is the first V2X revocation protocol to be co-designed
with a formal model.
Keywords: ad hoc networks, authentication, security verification, V2X.
1 Introduction
The term Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) denotes the on-going trend to
include information and communication technologies (ICT) in vehicles and trans-
portation infrastructure in order to enable safer, coordinated, environmentally
friendly, and smarter transportation networks [36]. Having smarter transportation
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systems typically involves extending the communication capabilities between the
involved entities.
This goes by the term “Vehicle-to-X (V2X)” communication and involves
various forms of ad-hoc and cellular networking among vehicles and traffic
infrastructure. Security and privacy in V2X have played an important role right
from the start [22].
In particular, anonymity is a requirement in a V2X network as various privacy
issues arise from the frequent and real-time broadcasting of the position of vehicles
in an ITS [31], as otherwise mobility patterns can easily be identified. This makes
tracking and profiling of entities possible, which can be used to systematically
collect and infer private information. Pseudonym certificates (pseudonyms) [25]
are the most commonly applied way to address privacy concerns and are also
foreseen in emerging standards.
Schaub et al. [31] discuss various requirements for such a pseudonym system
and Petit et al. [25] survey a large body of existing work and from there identify
an abstract pseudonym life cycle which is comprised of five main phases: issuance,
use, change, resolution and revocation. Within an ITS architecture there are three
trusted third parties that support the life cycle of pseudonyms: a certification
authority (CA), a provider of pseudonyms (PP), and a revocation authority (RA).
The CA issues long-term credentials to vehicles. The PP is responsible for handing
out shorter-lived pseudonym certificates. The RA receives and collects information
such as reports on misbehaviour, takes decisions to revoke a misbehaving entity,
and implement this revocation by whatever means a specific scheme foresees.
Effective revocation has been identified as a challenge [29] due to the decen-
tralised nature of vehicle networks and the ability of vehicles to change their
active pseudonyms.
Related work. Pseudonym revocation techniques have largely been based on
the distribution of certificate revocation lists (CRLs) [25, 29], such that when
a misbehaving vehicle is revoked an updated CRL is broadcast to all vehicles.
Several approaches have been taken to optimise the protocols and distribution
process of CRL delivery [10,13,15,17,20,24]. However, these approaches often
either revoke only one pseudonym of a vehicle – thereby missing the goal of
removing a misbehaving vehicle completely – or they create a way of linking
pseudonyms – then hurting privacy protection.
Bißmeyer et al. [2] propose the CORPA protocol that allows conditional
pseudonym resolution which preserves the privacy.
Raya et al. propose an infrastructure-based revocation protocol [33], which
remotely deletes keys in a trusted component. Their protocol requires that a
vehicle’s identity is known to perform revocation, in combination with a CRL –
again a clear drawback with respect to privacy.
Schaub et al. propose V -Tokens [30], which introduces embedding vehicle
resolution information directly into pseudonyms. A V-Token is a ciphertext field
in the pseudonym certificate that is created from a vehicle’s identity, the CA’s
identity and a randomisation factor r all encrypted with the RA’s public key. In
this scheme multiple trusted parties need to collaborate to resolve the pseudonym,
which then reveals a vehicle’s identity that is used for revocation. In case of a
revocation, this therefore violates the privacy of vehicles, as resolution of their
pseudonym to an identity is required.
Förster et al. propose PUCA [11], a pseudonym scheme based on anonymous
credentials where privacy of the vehicle owner has absolute priority and no way
exists for resolving pseudonyms. PUCA foresees no way of credential revocation.
However, the same authors then also propose Rewire [12], a modular revocation
mechanism within a decentralised network which is not relying on the resolution
approach that can be used to introduce revocation in PUCA. Instead, Rewire
assumes on-board Trusted Components (TC) in vehicles to support revocation.
A series of EU research projects, e.g., SeVeCom [23], EVITA [34] and PRE-
CIOSA [26] have investigated securing V2X architectures using TCs. The recent
project PRESERVE [27] has even prototyped this in an ASIC for secure ITS.
Feiri et al. [9] propose to use TCs to store pseudonyms in secure storage and
use a physical-unclonable function (PUF) to reduce the need for large amounts
of secure storage. Based on such earlier work, it seems a reasonable assumption
that hardware security modules (HSMs) are available as trust anchors, as done
in the specification of our O-token approach.
In this paper we explore the two versions of the Rewire protocols [12], which
are referred to as Rewire Plain and R-token. This protocol represents the
current state of the art of those proposed for revocation in V2X architectures.
No revocation protocol has been deployed in vehicles as yet.
Contribution. In this paper, we describe the formalisation of the revocation
protocols proposed by Förster et al. [12], which was done using multiset rewriting
as supported by the Tamarin prover. These protocols have not previously
been formally analysed. We present definitions of functional correctness and
authentication as properties of the protocols. Our formal analysis reveals that the
Plain model does not preserve functional correctness, specifically that a vehicle
is not guaranteed to be revoked and therefore could continue to participate in
communication messages within an ITS. This formally confirms a flaw that was
observed by Förster et al. [12]. Our analysis of the R-token protocol identifies
a hitherto unknown flaw: that it does not guarantee authentication properties,
in particular it does not guarantee that the confirmation of revocation actually
came from the intended vehicle. This new unknown weakness is acknowledged by
the authors of the R-token protocol as a flaw.
The insights gained from the formal modelling motivated our proposal for a
new protocol. We therefore develop a new protocol which proposes improvements
to the Rewire protocols that ensures correct revocation of an entity under any
pseudonym without requiring resolution even if its active pseudonym has changed
by the time of revocation. In this paper we refer to our new protocol as the
Obscure Token (O-token) protocol. Its novelty is the inclusion of an additional
asymmetric key pair for signature, used to augment the pseudonyms that are
utilised within message exchanges for verifiable revocation. The new protocol
is shown to preserve all the desired authentication and functional correctness
properties. Our proposed protocol, similar to the previous protocols discussed in
Fig. 1: High-level V2X Revocation Scenario
this paper, requires a trusted device at the car which will engage in the revocation
protocol and on completion can be trusted to erase all of the pseudonyms that
the car may have available.
Due to limited space, we will not present the details of the Tamarin model
rules and lemmas in this paper. The models of the three protocols presented in
this paper have been made available [35].
Structure. This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents a revocation
scenario. Section 3 introduces Tamarin, together with the security notation
used throughout the paper and the modelling assumptions made in our symbolic
models. Section 4 defines formal models and evaluates the existing Rewire
protocols. Section 5 presents our new enhanced Rewire protocol and its analysis
and Section 6 finally provides conclusions and identifies preservation of privacy
properties as an area of future analysis for revocation protocols.
2 System Model and Revocation Scenario
The process of revocation for the existing Rewire protocols and our O-token
protocol follows the same pattern shown in Figure 1. Figure 1 illustrates the
three main authorities in an ITS, namely the CA, the PP and the RA, and how
vehicles interact with them. The purpose of these authorities and vehicles in a
revocation scenario is as follows:
• The CA and PP issue long-term certificates and pseudonyms respectively
to vehicles and may optionally implement a resolution mechanism to allow
linking back pseudonyms to long-term IDs.
• Vehicles in the ITS communicate with other participants. They monitor each
others behaviour using misbehaviour detection mechanisms [14] and may
issue reports of vehicle misbehaviour to the RA.
• The RA collects misbehaviour reports from participating vehicles in an ITS,
and takes a decision to revoke reported pseudonyms. It then creates and
broadcasts signed revocation messages to the misbehaving vehicle.
• Vehicles receive and process revocation commands to revoke their pseudonyms,
and send confirmations back to the RA.
The Rewire protocols and our variant has the following steps: In step 1
vehicle V1 obtains a long-term certificate from the CA enabling it to obtain
pseudonyms. In step 2 V1 obtains pseudonyms from the PP to communicate
securely with other vehicles including vehicle V2. Steps 1 and 2 are not part
of a revocation protocol itself, rather they are part of the issuance phase of
pseudonyms. During the communication in the ITS, vehicle V1 will receive
messages from V2 under a pseudonym which could be changed frequently. V2 will
apply misbehaviour detection mechanisms [14] in order to detect indications of
faulty or malicious behaviour. Examples of such mechanisms may detect spoofed
positions or incorrect speeds reported in messages.
In such cases, step 3 is triggered by V1 submitting a misbehaviour report
to the RA accusing V2 of misbehaviour. Similarly other vehicles may make the
same report to the RA against V2 (omitted from the diagram). The RA takes a
decision to have V2’s access to the ITS infrastructure revoked if some threshold
is reached. Then the RA crafts a report containing the reason for revocation and
V2’s current pseudonym (step 4). Following the receipt, a revocation message is
broadcast to all vehicles in step 5. V2 receives the designated revocation message
and its TC will be triggered to delete all of its pseudonyms. Finally, V2 constructs
and sends a confirmation message back to the RA in step 6 to inform the RA all
of its pseudonyms were deleted.
3 Background and assumptions
3.1 Tamarin
We model and analyse all three protocols, the Plain and R-token protocols
and our new O-token protocol in Section 5 using the Tamarin prover. For this
paper we give a general description of what the Tamarin tool provides. There
are several full introductions to the tool [18,19,32] for further details.
The Tamarin prover is a symbolic analysis tool that is based on multi-set
rewriting rules and first order logic. It supports the analysis of security protocols,
which are described using multi-set rewrite rules to describe actions corresponding
to protocol agents taking part in protocol steps. Protocol messages are modelled
as terms which enable cryptographic protocol constructions such as encryption,
decryption, signatures and hashing to be expressed. Thus the terms in Table 1
are all expressible in Tamarin syntax. The global state of the system is captured
as a multi-set of Facts, which are expressed as predicates on terms, of the form
F (t1, . . . , tn). A rewrite rule, labelled by an action, takes a multi-set of facts, and
replaces (or rewrites) them with another multi-set of facts, labelled by an action.
A Dolev-Yao adversary is also built into the tool. The rewrite rules induce a
transition system describing the potential executions of (unbounded numbers of)
protocol instances in the context of the adversary. The transition system has a
formal semantics which underpins the soundness of the tool.
Properties on the actions can be expressed using first-order logic, enabling
requirements on executions to be defined. Tamarin enables the analysis of the
transition system with respect to such properties. Authentication properties are
typically of the form “for every execution, if action a2 occurs then action a1 must
previously have occurred”. For example, if a2 corresponds to agent A receiving
a confirmation message, and a1 corresponds to B sending that message, then
the authentication property is that A’s receipt of the message guarantees that B
sent it (i.e., it was not spoofed by the adversary). If every execution satisfies this
property then the protocol provides the authentication required.
Tamarin has numerous built-in security theories that abstractly support
common cryptographic functions. For example, in this paper we use the signing
built-in which models a signature scheme. It provides the function symbols sign
and verify such that digital signatures can be verified using the equation:
verify( sign( m, sk ), m, pk( sk ) ) = true.
3.2 Security Notation and Analysis
The notation defined in Table 1 is used across all models in the paper. The last
three entries are specific to our new protocol in Section 5. The following seven
proof goals are considered in this paper to model our correctness requirements.
G1: Executable ensures the model is executable and demonstrates successful
transmission of all core messages. It is a sanity check of the model’s correctness.
G2: Weak agreement, defined by Lowe [16], is a form of authentication which
guarantees that when an initiator A completes a run of the protocol then it was
interacting with another agent B who had also been running the protocol. In the
revocation protocols the initiator A is the RA and an agent B is a vehicle.
G3: Non-injective agreement, again defined by Lowe [16], adds a further
condition to ensure that the two agents, A and B, agree on the roles they are
taking and agree on the data items used in their message exchange. In our
protocols non-injective agreement guarantees that the RA and vehicle both agree
upon the completion of a run with each other and that in those runs the contents
of the received messages correspond to the sent messages.
G4: Non-injective synchronisation, defined by Cremers and Mauw [5], is very
similar to non-injective agreement but additionally requires that the corresponding
send and receive messages have to be executed in their expected order. This
means that in the revocation protocols revoke messages are sent later than receive
messages. This means that if a protocol preserves a non-injective synchronisation
property then the corresponding non-injective agreement property will also hold.
G5: Revoke after change esists, defined in this paper, states that if a vehicle
changes its pseudonym and a previous pseudonym is revoked, it should still be
Syntax Description
Vj An arbitrary vehicle j
SKVj PKVj Asymmetric key pair for Vj
Psi(Vj) i
th pseudonym of Vj
SKPsi(Vj) PKPsi(Vj)
Asymmetric pseudonym key pair for Vj ’s ith
pseudonym
SKRA PKRA Asymmetric key pair for the RA
σPsi(Vj) := {| Vj || PKVj || r |}SKVj
An R-token of the ith pseudonym of Vj ,
where r is a nonce
LTKVj
Long-term symmetric key of a vehicle Vj
(replaces asymmetric pair in line 2 above)
SKOPsi(Vj) PKOPsi(Vj)
Asymmetric key pair for an O-token,
belonging to the ith pseudonym of Vj
φPsi(Vj) := {| SKPsi(Vj) |}LTKVj An O-token of the ith pseudonym of Vj
Table 1: Security Notation
possible for the vehicle to create a message to confirm the Revocation Authority
(RA) that it has taken the action for revocation. This is a sanity check that the
a vehicle can be revoked even after a change of pseudonym.
G6: Order for self revocation (OSR) request received with change all, defined
in this paper, indicates that if a vehicle receives the OSR request, the vehicle
will perform the revocation and create a confirmation.
G7: Revoke with change all, defined in this paper, states that if a confirmation
of a pseudonym revocation is accepted by the RA from a vehicle then that vehicle
will have accepted and processed a revocation request from the RA.
3.3 Modelling Assumptions
In this section we provide a scope for the protocols and identify the modelling
abstractions that are used for the analysis. We assume that for each of the
protocol models a registration and enrolment phase has executed, resulting in
vehicles holding valid pseudonyms. All vehicles in a network have a Trusted
Component (TC) and abstractly this means that 1). vehicle keys cannot be
leaked, and 2). vehicles cannot ignore revocation messages. We consider the CA,
PP and RA to be distinct roles and in the architecture there is one of each. These
roles are all trustworthy and therefore, we remove the possibility of their keys
leaking from the analysis.
Step 1 and 2 in Section 2 denotes the issuing of pseudonyms to vehicles by
the CA and will be abstractly captured as a rule within our models. A revocation
protocol focuses on steps 3, 4, 5 and 6 from Figure 1. Within the Tamarin model
steps 3 and 4 are abstractly represented by a report event which the RA receives.
Steps 5 and 6 are described in three rules which focus on the message exchange
to revoke a vehicle and a confirmation to affirm the vehicle followed the request.
All the formal models in this paper follow this pattern of communication but the
format of the messages and the verification that can be performed on the signed
messages changes with each protocol.
The Dolev-Yao adversary in our models is in control of the network and
other untrusted parts of the system including the vehicles themselves. It is not
in control of the TCs of the vehicles and the trusted third parties.
4 Rewire Protocols
This section describes our modelling and analysis of the Plain and R-token
protocols. Our security and functional correctness analysis shows the following
main results which are weaknesses in the existing protocols:
• If the Plain protocol executes a change of pseudonym, then no confirmation
guarantee can be communicated to the RA. Hence even though authentication
properties may hold, a misbehaving vehicle may avoid revocation by changing
its pseudonym, and so functional correctness will not be guaranteed. While
the original paper [12] already identified this issue and addressed it in the
R-token version, Tamarin was independently able to discover this problem.
• Following attempted revocation of a vehicle’s pseudonym the RA is unable
to verify successful confirmation in the R-token scheme, thus none of the
authentication properties hold. In particular a confirmation can be spoofed
by a malicious agent and accepted by the RA, even when the misbehaving
vehicle is not revoked. This flaw was not previously recognised.
4.1 Rewire: Plain
Modelling. Section 3.3 informally identified the steps of a revocation protocol
based on the behaviour of an RA and a misbehaving vehicle. We model the
protocol roles of the RA and an arbitrary vehicle (Vj) in Tamarin by a set of
rewrite rules, which correspond to the steps of the protocol. The Plain model
has three distinct types of rules to: 1). setup all required key pairs for secure
communication, 2). create misbehaviour reports and 3). describe revocation
requests and receiving subsequent confirmation.
The heart of the protocol involves an exchange of messages to effect revocation:
an Order for Self-Revocation (OSR) request, followed by a confirmation response.
The OSR request message Osr-req [12] is the first message sent to a vehi-
cle, which triggers its revocation process. Osr-req contains the command to
revoke, the reported misbehaving pseudonym and additional information as to
why the revocation occurred. The pseudonym Psi(Vj)in this protocol is simply
PKPsi(Vj)belonging to Vj . Osr-req is signed by the RA, and can be verified by
receiving vehicles.
Osr-req := {| “revoke” || Psi(Vj) || reason |}SKRA
Goal Content Plain R-token O-token
G1 executable X X X
G2 weak_agreement X × X
G3 noninjective_agreement X × X
G4 noninjective_synchronisation X × X
G5 revoke_after_change_exists × X X
G6 osr_req_received_with_change_all n/a X X
G7 revoke_with_change_all n/a × X
Table 2: Summary of results
The Osr-req message is received and verified by a Vj , and the TC in Vjcan
identify the pseudonym as belonging to Vj . Following this identification the
vehicle constructs an Osr-conf message confirming the command to revoke was
followed, and the TC in Vjwill flag all available pseudonyms as revoked to prevent
their future use in V2X communication. The Osr-conf message is comprised of
two terms: a confirm command and the active reported public pseudonym key.
The message is signed with the corresponding secret pseudonym key.
Osr-conf := {| “confirm” || Psi(Vj) |}SKPsi(Vj)
We model a well formed Osr-req message duly signed by the RA and
addressed to its current pseudonym. The vehicle verifies that the message came
from the RA and contains the vehicle’s active pseudonym, before deleting all its
pseudonyms and creating the Osr-conf message signed under the active secret
pseudonym key, which is sent back to the RA. The adversary is able to learn the
Osr-req message terms and the signature. However the adversary cannot modify
the contents of the message as the adversary does not posses the RA’s secret key.
We also model the incoming Osr-conf message from a Vj . The RA verifies the
Osr-conf message is signed with the reported pseudonym PKPsi(Vj).
Proof Goals. We state several proof goals for our model, G1-G7 discussed
in Section 3.2, that represent authentication and functional correctness properties.
The results of whether each of the numbered proof goals hold are summarised
in Table 2. All the goals include predicates requiring that the vehicle’s long-term
key and secret pseudonym keys are not compromised, and so correct behaviour
is dependent on these keys not being compromised.
A successful run of the model guarantees that Vjwas running the protocol
with the RA. Receipt of the Osr-conf message represents completion of a run
for the RA. An Osr-req message is represented by facts from both the RA and
vehicle’s perspective. The model observes that the RA will have completed a
run and verified a confirmation from a vehicle. Furthermore, the vehicle must
have received the Osr-req message before it is possible for the RA to receive
the Osr-conf message, hence the communication order is preserved. The above
proof goals are trace authentication properties demonstrating that the attacker
RA V1
Ps1(Vj)
Change Pseudonym Ps1(V1) to Ps2(V1)
Osr-req{| “revoke" || Ps1(V1) || reason |}SKRA
Fig. 2: Rewire: Plain Pseudonym Scheme incomplete run
cannot construct Osr-req or Osr-conf messages from its observations. Thus no
logical attacks are identified for the Plain protocol from our symbolic analysis.
4.2 Rewire: Plain with change of pseudonym
Modelling. In the Plain pseudonym scheme revocation of Rewire [12], a
change of pseudonym for a vehicle can occur at any point prior to an Osr-req
being received. For example, consider a vehicle V1 and two of its pseudonyms
Ps1(V1) and Ps2(V1) in the following change of pseudonym scenario. When the
RA receives a report to revoke V1, it broadcasts the Osr-req message containing
the misbehaving pseudonym Ps1(V1), as shown in Figure 2. However, before
an Osr-req message is ever received by V1 a change of pseudonym can occur
resulting in a new pseudonym now being active. In an naïve implementation,
changing to Ps2(V1) means that the receipt of the Osr-req will be ignored as the
vehicle has deleted its previous pseudonym. Therefore, no Osr-conf message
will be generated by V1 as the vehicle has deleted its previous pseudonyms and
the revocation process will fail. Consequently V1 can continue to misbehave under
the new pseudonym Ps2(V1).
We model the changing of pseudonyms in such a way that the model creates
a fresh pseudonym key for an arbitrary vehicle Vj . The “can change” fact is
included to control when a vehicle can change its current pseudonym. The model
concludes by storing the new pseudonym secret key for Vjand outputs the public
key of the new pseudonym, which the intruder learns.
Proof Goals. Adding this extra behaviour to the protocol yields another
proof goal, G5, discussed in Section 3.2. If a vehicle changes its pseudonym and
a previous pseudonym is revoked, it should be possible for the vehicle to create
an Osr-conf message. This model fails for the Plain protocol, showing that
the protocol does not guarantee a successful revocation of a misbehaving vehicle
in the presence of changing pseudonyms, and indeed that if a vehicle changes
its pseudonym then it can escape revocation. Therefore, the Plain protocol is
not functionally correct in the context of changing pseudonyms. To address this
shortcoming in [11,12] a variant to the Plain protocol is proposed, referred to
as the R-token protocol.
4.3 Rewire: R-token
Modelling. The R-token variant embeds additional information in pseudonym
certificates with the aim of allowing revocation even with changing pseudonyms.
RA V1
Change Ps1(V1) to Ps2(V1)
Osr-req{| “revoke" || Ps1(V1) || reason |}SKRA
Decrypt σPs1(V1) with SKV1
Osr-conf{| “confirm" || σPs1(V1) |}SKV1
ni-sync
Fig. 3: Rewire: R-token Scheme
This additional information is an R-token, σPsi(Vj), which is constructed from
a vehicle’s public identity, public key and a nonce r, encrypted under a vehicle’s
secret key. There is a fresh R-token for each pseudonym. Psi(Vj)in this protocol
is a pseudonym containing PKPsi(Vj)and the R-token σPsi(Vj).
It is the purpose of the R-token to allow a vehicle to later detect whether a
revocation request is directed to it, without allowing others to identify the vehicle.
By encrypting the R-token under SKVj , all vehicles must attempt to decrypt
the R-token. Only the correct vehicle can decrypt the R-token, meaning the
revocation was designated for the vehicle and should be executed.
In PUCA and Rewire a “cut and choose" approach [28] is used to generate
the R-token, but in the model we have simply abstracted this to a fresh value
that is encrypted under the secret key of the vehicle.
The R-token protocol is represented in Figure 3. The Osr-req message
is of the same format as the Plain protocol where the pseudonym contains
the R-token. Once a vehicle receives an Osr-req it attempts to decrypt the
R-token irrespective of its active pseudonym. Only the designated vehicle can
decrypt the R-token since the decryption uses SKVj , others will simply ignore
the Osr-req. The Osr-conf message now contains the R-token and not the
pseudonym, and the message is signed with the vehicle’s secret key.
Osr-conf := {| “confirm” || σPsi(Vj) |}SKVj
The modelling of the rules for the R-token protocol is almost identical but
there are two important changes. Firstly the model includes having to decrypt
the R-token as an additional action. Secondly, the model is weakened to remove
the verify step (which checks the correctness of the confirmation σPsi(Vj)) since
the RA is not in possession of the PKVj .
Proof Goals. For consistency we analysed functional correctness. All the
proof goals for the Plain protocol remain applicable. Proof goal G5 holds
because any vehicle can create a confirmation message. Two additional goals
are included to analyse the correct behaviour of the vehicle (G6) and RA (G7)
in the context of changing pseudonyms, as shown in Table 2. For each goal we
again assume that SKVj is not compromised. The security analysis yields that
neither of the authentication properties hold. The adversary is able to intercept
the Osr-req message and create a Osr-conf message containing the inferred
R-token. The adversary then generates a fresh secret key which is used to
sign the Osr-conf message. The created Osr-conf is sent to the RA. The RA
accepts the confirmation but cannot verify its authenticity because the LTKVj is
only known to Vjand CA. Therefore, The RA does not obtain a guarantee that
it is communicating with a running vehicle.
This flaw in the protocol was not previously recognised, and has been accepted
by the designers of the R-token protocol.
5 O-token Protocol
Modelling. To solve the issue of the RA not being able to verify the confirmation
message, Osr-conf, we propose the O-token protocol. Note that the O-token
mimics the R-token closely: the reason for generating different O-tokens for
each pseudonym is the same as for the R-token, to ensure unlinkability of the
vehicle in question. If the R-token or O-token remained the same, it would
act as a vehicle identifier.
We replace the R-token in the previous scheme with a simpler construction:
an O-token for the ith pseudonym of Vj , φPsi(Vj), consisting of an SKOPsi(Vj)key
which is encrypted under LTKVj . Each O-token is fresh and associated with
one and only one Psi(Vj)pseudonym.
φPsi(Vj) := {| SKOPsi(Vj) |}LTKVj
The aim of using fresh SKOPsi(Vj)keys is to make pseudonyms unlinkable.
The pseudonym also contains one additional field, PKOPsi(Vj) , which is the
corresponding public key for the particular O-token. Therefore, the pseudonym
contains enough information for the RA to verify a received Osr-conf message
and for the vehicle to change its pseudonym.
A revocation run which uses O-token is shown in Figure 4. The Osr-
req message is of the same format as the other protocols but the pseudonym
contains the O-token. The Osr-conf message now contains the O-token and
the message is signed with SKOPsi(Vj) instead of signing with LTKVjwhich the
vehicle extracted earlier:
Osr-conf := {|“confirm” || φPsi(Vj) |}SKOPsi(Vj)
The subtle change in signing the Osr-conf message, together with the RA’s
knowledge of PKOPsi(Vj)enables the RA to verify the confirmation message.
The modelling of the other rules for the O-token protocol is largely similar
but there are two further changes. Firstly, the rule for receiving the OSR request
includes having to decrypt the O-token as an additional action, Secondly,
changing pseudonym behaviour is supported with a new rule, by creating a fresh
pseudonym secret key, a fresh SKOPsi(Vj)and the newly encrypted O-token.
RA
SKRA, PKOPsi(Vj) , φPsi(Vj)
Vj
PKRA, LTKVj , SKOPsi(Vj)
Change Pseudonym Ps1(Vj) to Ps2(Vj)
Osr-req{| “revoke" || Ps1(Vj) || reason |}SKRA
Verify and extract φPs1(Vj)
Decrypt φPs1(Vj) OR Fail
Delete all Pseudonyms
Osr-conf{| “confirm" || φPs1(Vj) |}SKOPs1(Vj)
Verify Osr-conf
ni-sync ni-sync
Fig. 4: O-token Revocation
Proof Goals. The results for the formal analysis for the O-token protocol
is presented in Table 2 and achieves all desired guarantees. Notably all the
authentication properties hold which means that the RA is communicating with
the revoked vehicle and can verify the received confirmation, which was not the
case with the R-token protocol. Therefore, all the desired functional correctness
properties hold.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
The new O-token protocol proposed in this paper allows revocation even if
vehicles have changed pseudonym. It also allows the RA to verify a confirmation
sent by a vehicle that it has deleted its pseudonyms. The formal analysis estab-
lishes that verifying such a confirmation provides a guarantee that the revocation
occurred. We have therefore shown through formal analysis that the desired
functional correctness and authentication properties hold. The new O-token
protocol for Rewire was developed by first formally modelling and analysing the
two previous variants of Rewire, then identifying weaknesses in their functional
correctness and a failure to meet required authentication properties.
In an implementation of a revocation protocol, heartbeats provide protection
against non-delivery of revocation requests by incorporating such requests within
the heartbeats. TCs within a vehicle expect heartbeats (which may contain
revocation requests), which are generated by the RA. TCs will take appropriate
action if they are not received, under the assumption that they have been blocked.
Therefore, augmenting a formal analysis with heartbeats will require a more
detailed model of a TC and further adversarial behaviour. With respect to the
greater level of detail timestamps may also be important in modelling time out
behaviour of heartbeats. The inclusion of time may also allow us to model the
retention of keys before the deletion of pseudonyms. TC’s could also consider
storing the last k pseudonyms and the analysis would need to ensure that the
adversary could not evade revocation by changing pseudonym at least k times.
Another consideration in an implementation is the handling of cases where no
confirmation is sent. If heartbeats are not used then further revocation requests
will need to be sent until confirmation is received.
In the analysis, we currently focus on functional correctness and authentication.
In future work we will consider generalising the correctness analysis, in particular
G5, to include liveness properties such that we could prove a more general
property such as “any revocation request must eventually be confirmed”. The
Tamarin tool chain has been extended in a recent paper by Backes et al. [21]
to enable verification of liveness properties. Not considered here are privacy
requirements such as unlinkability which could likewise merit a formal analysis.
Delaune & Hirschi [7] and Chadha et al. [4] survey various anonymity and
privacy related properties, including anonymity, unlinkability and strong secrecy,
which can be proved using equivalence-based reasoning. Behavioural equivalence
allows us to determine whether two situations are different, in particular whether
the confirmation of a revocation came from one vehicle or another. The use of
process equivalences to analyse privacy properties can also be seen in Tamarin [1]
and in other modelling tools, e.g. ProVerif [3], which has been used successfully
to analyse privacy properties [6, 8]. Future work will be to explore anonymity
and privacy properties of revocation protocols and of other V2X protocols.
Our proposed protocol requires a trusted device at the car which can be trusted
to erase all of the pseudonyms that the car may have available. However, it is
still under debate whether this is the right trust model for the car. Furthermore,
which functions is it reasonable to place within this trusted device, and which
cannot be made trustworthy? To answer these questions in a satisfactory way
is not straightforward, and to make the vehicle industry reach agreement on a
specific trust model is even more demanding. This is an interesting challenge for
future work.
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